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Abstract—Ethereum smart contracts have recently drawn a
considerable amount of attention from the media, the financial
industry and academia. With the increase in popularity, malicious
users found new opportunities to profit by deceiving newcom-
ers. Consequently, attackers started luring other attackers into
contracts that seem to have exploitable flaws, but that actually
contain a complex hidden trap that in the end benefits the
contract creator. In the blockchain community, these contracts
are known as honeypots. A recent study presented a tool
called HONEYBADGER that uses symbolic execution to detect
honeypots by analyzing contract bytecode. In this paper, we
present a data science detection approach based foremost on the
contract transaction behavior. We create a partition of all the
possible cases of fund movements between the contract creator,
the contract, the transaction sender and other participants. To
this end, we add transaction aggregated features, such as the
number of transactions and the corresponding mean value and
other contract features, for example compilation information and
source code length. We find that all aforementioned categories of
features contain useful information for the detection of honeypots.
Moreover, our approach allows us to detect new, previously unde-
tected honeypots of already known techniques. We furthermore
employ our method to test the detection of unknown honeypot
techniques by sequentially removing one technique from the
training set. We show that our method is capable of discovering
the removed honeypot techniques. Finally, we discovered two new
techniques that were previously not known.
Index Terms—Data Science, Ethereum, Honeypots
I. INTRODUCTION
Blockchain technology revolutionized the way assets are
traded around the world. A blockchain can be seen as an
append-only ledger that is maintained by a decentralised peer-
to-peer network. The transfer of assets is recorded in form of
transactions, which are further grouped into so-called blocks.
Each block is linked to its predecessor via cryptographic
means, thereby forming a “blockchain”. This list of blocks is
stored across the participants of the blockchain. A consensus
protocol dictates the appending of new blocks. Bitcoin [1] and
Ethereum [2] are currently the two most prominent blockchain
implementations. Blockchain is considered as one of today’s
major innovations due to the fact that it allows to decentralize
the governance of any asset. While the purpose of the Bitcoin
blockchain is to decentralize the governance of cash, and
thereby the role of banks, the purpose of the Ethereum
blockchain is to decentralize the computer as a whole.
Ethereum builds on top of Bitcoin’s principles and addition-
ally offers the execution of so-called smart contracts. Smart
contracts are Turing-complete programs that are executed by
the participants of the Ethereum peer-to-peer network. They
are identified by an address, and are deployed or invoked
via transactions. We distinguish between normal and internal
transactions. Normal transactions refer to transactions that are
initiated by user accounts, whereas internal transactions refer
to transactions that are initiated by smart contracts and are
performed as a reaction to a normal transaction. In other
words, every internal transaction has a normal transaction
as its origin. Smart contracts may interact with Ethereum’s
native cryptocurrency called ether, and receive data input from
participants. The blockchain enforces that smart contracts are
run exactly as they are programmed, without any possibility
of censorship. The execution of smart contracts costs gas.
Users can determine how much gas they want to provide
to the execution of a smart contract (gas limit), and how
much they want to pay per gas unit in terms of ether (gas
price). If the total amount of gas assigned to a transaction
is consumed before the end of the execution, the latter is
terminated by throwing an error and reversing the effects
of the transaction. Smart contracts are usually programmed
using a high-level programming language, such as Solidity [3].
As with any program, smart contracts may contain bugs [4].
Several smart contracts have already been attacked in the past.
The two most prominent hacks, the DAO hack [5] and the
Parity wallet hacks [6], caused together a loss of over $400
million. As a result, attackers started looking for vulnerable
smart contracts [4]. Interestingly, recent works show that
attackers started purposefully deploying vulnerable-looking
smart contracts in order to lure other attackers into traps [7],
[8]. This new type of fraud is known as “honeypots” [9],
[10]. Honeypots are smart contracts that appear to have a
flaw in their design. This flaw typically allows any arbitrary
user on the Ethereum blockchain to drain the funds contained
in the contract. However, once a user tries to exploit this
apparent vulnerability, a trapdoor obfuscated into the contract
prevents the draining of funds to succeed. The attempt at
exploitation of these honeypot contracts does not come for
free. Their exploitation is always linked to the transfer of
a certain amount of ether to the contract. The idea is that
the victim solely focuses on the apparent vulnerability and
does not consider the possibility that a trap might be hidden
inside the contract. Moreover, honeypot creators often upload
the source code of their smart contract to Etherscan [11] in
order to facilitate the detection of their “vulnerable” smart
contract. Etherscan is an online platform that allows anyone to
navigate through the Ethereum blockchain and to publish the
source code of any smart contract. Honeypots can be grouped
into different techniques, depending on the trapdoor that they
use. Torres et al. [7] present a tool called HONEYBADGER
that applies symbolic analysis to contract bytecode and relies
on handcrafted rules to detect honeypots. Unfortunately, this
approach cannot recognize new honeypot techniques unless
experts are aware of them and specific detection rules are
implemented. Moreover, HONEYBADGER only relies on the
bytecode of a smart contract and does not consider transaction
data. However, transaction data reflects user behavior which
might be useful to detect honeypot techniques.
In this study, we propose to train a model to classify
Ethereum smart contracts into honeypots and non-honeypots.
Our model takes features from the source code, transaction
data and flow of funds. We use the results from the HON-
EYBADGER study as labels in order to train our model and
validate our results. To the best of our knowledge, no previous
study has analysed the behavior of honeypot contracts in
the Ethereum blockchain from a data science perspective. In
summary, we make three contributions. First, we present a
step by step methodology to obtain, process and explore data
related to Ethereum smart contracts and their transactions.
Second, we propose several honeypot classification models
that can generalize well to unseen honeypot instances and tech-
niques. Third, we describe how we used our machine learning
models to discover cases of honeypot contracts that were not
detected by HONEYBADGER. We also found honeypots from
two completely new techniques that we define in this paper.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Data Science and Machine Learning
Data science is a discipline that draws techniques from dif-
ferent fields like mathematics, statistics, computer science, and
information science, with the goal of discovering insights from
real world data. The term is closely related to other fields such
as machine learning, data mining and business intelligence.
Machine Learning is the sub-field of Artificial Intelligence
that provides computer programs with the ability to improve
from experience without being explicitly programmed [12].
Supervised machine learning algorithms can identify patterns
that relate features (measurable characteristics of the data) to
labels (a particular property of the data). The learning or
training process takes place when the algorithms search for
patterns based on examples for which the labels are known.
The result is a model, an approximation of the underlying
relationship between features and labels. During the testing
step, the model assigns labels to samples that were not part
of the training phase, and these assignments or predictions are
compared to known labels. The purpose is to evaluate how well
the model generalizes to unseen cases. If each label represents
one option from a set of possible classes, a supervised machine
learning problem is known as a classification.
XGBoost [13] is a very popular tool among the data science
community, but it is in fact a fast implementation of an
older algorithm known as gradient boosted machines [14].
A boosting algorithm is an ensemble of sequential models
where each model corrects the errors of the previous one. In
particular, gradient boosting refers to the technique of min-
imizing the prediction residuals using gradient descent. The
default and most common ensemble members for XGBoost
are Decision Trees [15]. Like many other machine learning
models, XGBoost outputs for each sample the probability
of belonging to each class. For a binary classification, the
predicted class is usually defined by splitting the predicted
probability in two using 0.5 as a threshold.
B. Honeypots
Torres et al. [7] identified eight different honeypot tech-
niques. In general, honeypots use a bait in the form of funds
to lure users into traps. After looking at the source code1, users
are tricked into believing that there is a vulnerability and that
they will receive more funds than they require to trigger the
vulnerability. However, it is not clear to the users that the
honeypot contains a hidden trapdoor that causes all or most
of the funds to remain in the honeypot. In the following, we
provide a summary of the hidden trapdoors that honeypots use
to deceive naive users.
Balance Disorder (BD). This honeypot technique uses the
fact that some users are misinformed regarding the exact
moment at which a contract’s balance is updated. A honeypot
using this technique promises to return its balance and the
value sent to it, if the latter is larger than the balance. However,
the sent value is added to the balance before executing the
honeypot’s code. As a result, the balance will never be smaller
than the sent value.
Inheritance Disorder (ID). This honeypot technique in-
volves two contracts and an inheritance relationship between
them. Both the parent and the child contract each define a
variable with the same name that guards the access to the
withdrawal of funds. Although novice users may believe that
both variables are the same, they are treated differently by
the smart contract. As a result, changing the content of one
variable does not change the content of the other variable.
Skip Empty String Literal (SESL). A bug previously con-
tained in the the Solidity compiler skips hard coded empty
string literals in the parameters of function calls. Thus, the
parameters following the empty string literal are shifted up-
wards. This can be used to redirect the transfer of funds to the
attacker instead of the users.
Type Deduction Overflow (TDO). Although variables are
usually declared with specific types, type deduction is also
supported2. A type is then inferred, without the guarantee
that it is sufficiently large. This can be used to cause integer
overflows that prematurely terminate execution and make the
honeypot deviate from the behavior expected by the user.
Uninitialised Struct (US). Structs are a convenient way
in Solidity to group information. However, they need to be
initialised appropriately, as values written to an uninitialised
1The source code is often made publicly available to lure victims.
2Until compiler version 0.5.0 https://solidity.readthedocs.io/en/v0.5.0/.
struct are written by default to the beginning of the storage.
This overwrites existing values and modifies the contract’s
state. Thus, variables required to perform the transfer of funds
may be overwritten and thereby prevent the transfer.
Hidden State Update (HSU). Etherscan does not display
internal transactions that do not transfer any value. This can
be used to hide state updates from users and therefore make
them believe that the contract is in a totally different state.
Hidden Transfer (HT). Platforms such as Etherscan allow
users to view the source code of published smart contracts.
However, due to the limited size of the source code window,
publishers can insert white spaces to hide the displaying of
certain source code lines by pushing them outside the window.
This allows publishers to inject and hide code that transfers
funds to them instead of users.
Straw Man Contract (SMC). When uploading a contract’s
source code to Etherscan, only the contract itself is verified
and not the code of contracts that the contract may call. For
example, a source code file may contain two contracts, where
the first contract makes calls to the second contract. The
second one however, is actually not used after deployment.
Instead, it is a straw man standing in place of another contract
that selectively reverts transactions that transfer funds to users.
III. DATA ACQUISITION AND FEATURE EXTRACTION
A. Data
We limited this study to the 2,019,434 smart contracts
created in the first 6.5M blocks of the Ethereum blockchain.
Using the Etherscan API [16], we acquired compilation and
source code information for 158,863 contracts, and down-
loaded around 141M normal and 4.6M internal transactions.
B. Labels
We compile a list of contracts labeled as honeypots from
HONEYBADGER’s public code repository [17]. The repository
provides a list of honeypots for each technique where source
code is available on Etherscan. The authors developed a tool
that generated the labels, and for each case they indicated
if the labeling was correct after a manual inspection of the
contract source code. For groups of honeypot contracts that
share the exact same byte code, the authors only included one
representative address in their list. In order to obtain a label
for every contract, we calculate the sha256 hash for the byte
code of each contract, and group them based on the hashes.
We then transfer the label of each representative contract to
every contract in its group. We only label as honeypot the
contracts that were manually confirmed by the authors, and
ignore the false positives generated by their tool.
C. Features
We create a set of features in order to obtain a better under-
standing of the data, to verify that the behavior of transactions
reflects the used honeypot technique, and to automate the
detection of honeypots using machine learning.
We divide the features into three categories, depending on
where they originate from: source code information, transac-
tion properties, and fund flows. In the following sections we
describe the extraction process for each of the features in each
category and the reasons for their selection.
1) Source Code Features:
• hasByteCode:bool→ indicates if the contract was created
with bytecode. The absence of bytecode means that the
contract creation was erroneous and that the contract has
no behavior.
• hasSourceCode:bool → we hypothesize that the number
of source code lines of a honeypot is a decent approxi-
mation of the contract’s readability or interpretability.
• numSourceCodeLines:int→ counting the number of lines
in the source code does not entirely reflect readability
and interpretability characteristics, but it is a decent
approximation that does not require static code analysis
or symbolic execution.
• compilerRuns:int → we are interested in determining if
a high amount of optimizations during the compilation
could lead to an unexpected behavior that can be ex-
ploited by honeypots.
• library:int → we collected all the possible libraries and
created a categorical variable of 749 unique values. We
are interested in knowing if a library in particular is
correlated with the occurrence of honeypots.
And finally, we split the compilerVersion:str into three parts:
major, minor and patch. We are interested in finding if a major,
minor or patch version in particular affected the occurrence of
honeypots, caused by some change in the solidity language
compilation that can be exploited. For each part, we collected
all the possible values and calculated two categorical variables:
• compilerMinorVersion:int → 4 unique values.
• compilerPatchVersion:int → 330 unique values.
The compiler major version is 0 for all the examined contracts,
so we discard the feature for not providing any information.
2) Transaction Features: We begin with the features we
generate for both normal and internal transactions.
• [internal|normal]TransactionCount:int → the number of
transactions of the corresponding type associated with the
contract. We expect to filter out contracts with an abun-
dance of movements, which are probably not honeypots.
• [internal|normal]TransactionOtherSenderRatio:float →
we calculate this by dividing the number of unique
senders by the number of total senders, omitting the
contract creator in both. The feature should be 1 if every
transaction is sent by a different sender, close to zero
if few senders send many transactions and we define
it as zero if the creator is the only sender. We would
like to know if the participation of multiple senders is a
characteristic of honeypots or not.
Next, for each contract and for each property of transactions
involving fund movements, we compute the average and the
standard deviation. This yields a total of six features per
transaction type, normal and internal:
• [internal|normal]TransactionValue[Mean|Std]:float
• [internal|normal]TransactionGas[Mean|Std]:float
• [internal|normal]TransactionGasUsed[Mean|Std]:float
The value is only collected if there are no errors in the
transaction. If there is an error, the transaction including any
transferred values is rolled back, but the gas is still spent.
We expect the feature means to be positive but small for
honeypots, more varied for popular non-honeypot contracts,
and zero for contracts with testing purposes. Furthermore, for
the feature standard deviations we have some weak intuitions
we would like to test: high standard deviations for gas and
gas used may be correlated with contracts with many different
execution paths, becoming a proxy indicator for the complex-
ity of the contract code. The standard deviation for the value
may point out that the contract deals with different amounts
of funds.
Moreover, we extract features related to time and block
number for normal transactions. Internal transactions do not
carry their own timestamps or block numbers, and we cannot
assume the results from Etherscan to be chronologically sorted.
• normalTransactionBlockSpan:int → derived from the
block numbers of the first and last transaction.
• normalTransactionTimeSpan:int → computed from the
timestamps of the first and last transaction.
Our intuition is that honeypots have short lives compared to
other contracts, which was also pointed out in [7].
We also compute the difference of block and time between
transactions. Both the mean and standard deviation indicate
how often the contract receives transactions (only for contracts
with more than one transaction):
• normalTransactionBlockDelta[Mean|Std]:float
• normalTransactionTimeDelta[Mean|Std]:float
Lastly, features extracted only for internal transactions:
• internalTransactionCreationCount:int → indicates how
many contracts this contract created. Our hypothesis is
that honeypots are less likely to create other contracts.
• internalTransactionToOtherRatio:float → this is analo-
gous to the feature transactionOtherSenderRatio, how-
ever, it is calculated for the receivers instead of for the
senders.
3) Fund Flow Features: Finally, we define fund flow fea-
tures, based on the definition of honeypots. Accordingly, we
expect the following fund flow events to occur frequently with
honeypots.
1. A valid contract creation.
2. An initial deposit, that is, the creator sending ether to the
contract. This could be interpreted as “setting the trap”,
because without funds, no attacker would be interested
in exploiting flaws in the contract.
3. A victim falling for the trap, which means, a transaction
sent by an account different than the creator, for which
the funds are kept in the contract.
4. A withdraw of the profit to the creator.
Most importantly, a honeypot should rarely, if ever, present a
withdrawal from an account other than its creator.
We define different events triggered by normal transactions
(and potentially followed by internal transactions), where each
possible event corresponds to exactly one case. We describe
these cases with the combination of eight variables in Table I.
TABLE I
FUND FLOW VARIABLES.
Name Possible Values
sender creator, other
creation yes, no
error yes, no
balanceCreator up, unchanged, down
balanceContract up, unchanged, down
balanceSender up, unchanged, down
balanceOtherPositive yes, no
balanceOtherNegative yes, no
For each normal transaction we collect the resulting internal
transactions. The sender variable is determined by comparing
the transaction source to the contract creator. The creation
variable is set to yes only for the creation transaction. However,
the error variable value in this case is an aggregation: it is
set as True if the normal transaction or any of the triggered
internal transactions contain an error. For the balance changes,
we use the following algorithm: we initialize every account
with zero funds moved, and for each transaction (both normal
and internal), we subtract the value from the transaction.from
account and add it to the transaction.to account (or to the
transaction.contractAddress account if a contract is created).
After iterating over the transactions, we consider the funds
moved into the creator, contract and sender accounts. We
mark them as up, unchanged or down if the values are positive,
zero or negative respectively. If the balance of any account
other than the three mentioned above is changed, we have
two special flags that indicate if at least one other account
balance went up or down respectively. We prefer to keep a
small and fixed number of variables and computing all the
possible combinations yields 25 × 33 = 864 cases, many of
them invalid. For example, creation=yes only makes if when
sender=creator, and we only care about balanceSender if
sender=other. Also, at least one balance goes up if and only
if at least one balance goes down. After discarding invalid
combinations, we retain 244 valid cases. Finally, for every
contract, we extract the frequency of each case, by counting
how many times a case appears with respect to a contract
divided by the total amount of cases related to it.
IV. EXPLORATORY ANALYSIS
A. Most Relevant Numerical Features
We take all the numerical features and study their distribu-
tions for both classes, honeypots and non-honeypots to see if
there is a clear difference. In this study, we include only the
results for the features we consider the most relevant. This is
based on their difference with respect to the two classes.
First, we observe that honeypots seem to have a reasonable
amount of lines of code in general, with a minimum that
could include a fair amount of logic, and a maximum that
is still readable. On the other side, non-honeypots present
extreme values, from contracts with only one line of code
to a contract with more than 11K lines. Second, we see that
three quarters of the contracts have a small number of normal
transactions. However, the maximum amount is much larger
for non-honeypots than for honeypots. Lastly, it seems that
all honeypots always move some amount of ether, but most
non-honeypot contracts (over 75%) do not exchange value at
all. Nonetheless, non-honeypots have very extreme maximum
value movements, while honeypots move on average no more
than 2 ether.
Handcrafted rules could be used to cut off the extremes of
all these features. However, one of the problems of those rules,
is that they are overfitted to the dataset used to craft them. Even
if the boundaries are relaxed, if a new honeypot crosses one of
those boundaries (both accidentally or on purpose), it would
be automatically classified as non-honeypot disregarding the
rest of its properties. In any case, the rules we could craft can
capture all the honeypots but do not exclude a sufficiently large
portion of non-honeypots. We could start combining several
rules until we find the best honeypot filter, but the search for
the best criteria is exactly what machine learning is used for.
B. Categorical Variables
All the categorical features we extract belong to the com-
pilation and source code information category.
The compiler minor version has only four possible values.
Most of the contracts belong to the minor version 0.4, and in
particular, all but one honeypot among our samples belong to
that version too. These statistics agree with a popularity peak
in Ethereum described by the authors of HONEYBADGER [7].
The compiler patch version has 330 possible values. One
compiler version (0.4.19+commit.c4cbbb05) has been used
much more than others to compile honeypots, but there is
no specific honeypot technique that is significantly more
frequent than others for it. We repeat the procedure of counting
honeypot techniques for the rest of the compiler versions
obtaining the same results. This suggests that honeypot activity
is not linked to any compiler version. Rather it seems that the
high frequency for some versions is related to the time when
they were active, which could be at the same time linked with
Ethereum’s popularity.
Finally, none of the honeypots have a library. Hence, we
can presume that libraries are not linked at all with honeypot
development, or that no library contains vulnerabilities that
can be exploited for honeypot related purposes.
C. Fund Flow Cases
We study the events related to fund movements, in order to
verify if honeypots behave as we expect. For this, we query
our data by partially defining some of the fund flow variables
and adding the frequencies of all matching cases.
We assumed that honeypots should have a deposit from its
creator to work, since funds are needed to attract attackers.
However, we find that 29 honeypots (around 10% of them)
do not match this criteria. Inspecting individual cases, we find
that these contracts are actually honeypots, but that they rely
on initial deposits from victims to attract even more victims.
Another explanation could be that the creators of honeypots
sometimes use a different account to set their trap. We do
not find clear evidence of such practice among our data, but
future work could address this topic, for example, using graph
techniques to find colluding accounts.
We find 192 honeypots that do not have any deposits from
non-creator accounts, which means that only 103 (roughly
35% of them) were able to lure victims into sending funds.
This metric is close the statistics presented in [7]. Moreover,
only 108 honeypot contracts (∼37% of them) present with-
draws from the creator. It makes sense to expect the creator to
withdraw funds only if the trap was effective. Yet, the amount
of honeypots with creator withdraws is higher than the amount
of effective ones, which indicates that the creator sometimes
withdraws the bait when the trap seems not to be working.
Honeypots should never present withdraws from non-creator
accounts, but 50 cases (∼17%) matching this criteria. We
find some interesting cases among this group, where the
honeypot creator failed to set the trap properly. For example,
one contract3 that belongs to the Hidden State Update category.
For this kind of honeypot, a transaction is needed to change
the value of one or more variables in the contract. This
update mechanism is usually hard to track, because Etherscan
does not publish internal transactions that carry no value, and
victims fall into a trap when they do not know the state of
the contract. However, for our contract example, the hidden
state change transaction is missing, and the users that were
supposed to be victims made a profit.
Among the top five most frequent balance movement cases,
we find creator deposits and withdrawals, deposits from non-
creator accounts, and the contract creation (without any fund
movement). The unexpected top case for honeypots contracts
are transactions from non-creator accounts that do not generate
any kind of fund movement. Furthermore, deposits from non-
creator accounts are also very common for non-honeypot
contracts. The details are enumerated in Table II.
V. EXPERIMENTS
A. Additional Pre-Processing
Before starting any of the machine learning experiments,
we need to take further data cleaning steps. Missing values
in our dataset are mostly a product of our own feature
extraction. For any kind of transaction, the value aggregated
features cannot be calculated when all the transactions from
the contract contain errors, because no funds were actually
moved. For normal transactions in particular, the difference of
time or block number between consecutive normal transactions
cannot be measured when the contract only has one normal
transaction. The rest of the normal transaction features are
always defined, because there is always at least one normal
transaction (the creation, even if it contains errors). Never-
theless, for all these situations we found it reasonable to fill
the missing values with zeros. However, a contract may not
3address=0xbC272B58E7cD0a6002c95aFD1F208898D756C580
TABLE II
THE FIVE MOST FREQUENT FUND FLOW CASES BY BINARY LABEL, HONEYPOT OR NON-HONEYPOT. THE COUNT REPRESENTS THE NUMBER OF NORMAL
TRANSACTIONS THAT MATCH THE FUND FLOW CASE. THE IDS ARE ARBITRARY VALUES USED TO IDENTIFY THE FEATURES LATER ON. FOR
READABILITY PURPOSES THE BOOLEAN VARIABLES WITH FALSE VALUES AND THE BALANCE VARIABLES WITHOUT CHANGES ARE NOT INCLUDED.
Honeypots
Count ID Description
341 205 sender=other
304 83 sender=creator, balanceCreator=negative, balanceContract=positive
292 33 sender=creator, creation=True
168 201 sender=other, balanceContract=positive, balanceSender=negative
136 73 sender=creator, balanceCreator=positive, balanceContract=negative
Non-Honeypots
Count ID Description
94475857 205 sender=other
9667149 207 sender=other, balanceSender=negative, balanceOtherPositive=True
9130582 201 sender=other, balanceContract=positive, balanceSender=negative
8569634 77 sender=creator
5647532 127 sender=other, error=True
have any internal transactions and, consequently, all the related
aggregated features are not defined. Even if those features
could be filled with zeros, only 18% of the contracts have
internal transactions. Hence, for the following experiments we
discard the aggregated features related to internal transactions,
but we add a new boolean feature that indicates the presence
of internal transactions.
Furthermore, not every contract is useful for our classifica-
tion task. Contracts without bytecode will never be honeypots
because they cannot be executed, hence, we discard them. We
also discard contracts without source code because:
• It is harder to lure victims looking for vulnerabilities in
contracts if the source code is not publicly available.
• We only have labels for contracts with source code.
• We cannot compute features from the compilation and
source code category for contracts without source code.
After the filtering step, the amount of samples in our dataset
is reduced to 158,568 non-honeypots and 295 honeypots.
In addition we find that not all fund flow cases are useful.
Therefore, we discard all those that do not have any frequency
across our reduced dataset. Thus, we end up with 74 out of 244
cases that are useful for describing the transaction behavior.
We also check the variance of each individual feature, but none
of them present a variance very close to zero, thus we do not
discard any further dataset columns.
Our last step is taking any “unbounded” numerical feature
(the ones that are neither frequencies nor ratios), and apply
min-max scaling to shrink them into the range [0, 1]. We use
this technique to have every feature in the same range, which
allows us to better understand feature importance later on.
B. Honeypot Detection
In this section, we train a machine learning model called
XGBoost [13] to classify contracts into honeypots (the positive
class) or non-honeypots (the negative class).
We use k-fold cross-validation to ensure that the models
generalize to unseen data. The data is split into k = 10
separate subsets called folds, where one is selected for testing,
while the algorithm is trained on all the remaining folds. The
procedure is repeated k times so that each fold is used once for
testing. In particular, we use stratified k-fold cross-validation,
in which the folds are selected to preserve class proportions.
Furthermore, we deal with an imbalanced classification
problem: our dataset contains many more non-honeypot con-
tracts than honeypot contracts. This issue has a negative
impact in the classification capabilities of machine learning
algorithms. To address this issue, we configure XGBoost to
train with a scaling weight for the positive class [18].
We use the AUROC (Area Under the Receiver Operating
Characteristics) to quantify the power of our model on each
fold. The ROC curve describes the TPR (True Positive Rate)
against the FPR (False Positive Rate) for different thresholds
over the classification probability. The area under that curve
represents how well the model can distinguish the two classes.
TABLE III
HONEYPOT CLASSIFICATION EXPERIMENTS FOR DIFFERENT CATEGORIES
OF FEATURES. WE SHOW THE AUROC MEAN AND STANDARD DEVIATION
FOR TRAIN AND TEST COLLECTED ACROSS ALL FOLDS.
Features Train Test
All 0.985 ± 0.002 0.968± 0.015
Only Transactions 0.966 ± 0.004 0.954± 0.030
Only Source Code 0.953 ± 0.002 0.942± 0.025
Only Fund Flow 0.952 ± 0.002 0.938± 0.023
In Table III we compare train and test AUROC for four sets
of features: the features based only on source code informa-
tion, based only on aggregated transaction data, based only on
fund flow case frequencies, or using all the features together. In
general, for every experiment the difference between train and
test is not large, indicating that all the models can generalize
well to unseen samples. In particular, each individual set of
features presents good results, with a slight advantage when
using all the feature sets together. In order to understand
better the difference between the four alternatives, we list
the three most important features per feature set in Table IV.
First, the most important feature from the source code group
is the number of source code lines, and the following most
important are related to the compiler version. The problem
with relying on the compiler version, is that even if some
values are correlated with honeypots in the present dataset,
those relations might become irrelevant for new compiler
versions. The compiler versions we cover in this study can still
be used in the future, but might become less popular over time.
Second, the frequency of deposits to a contract from its creator
(fundFlowCase83) is a very distinctive fund flow feature, and
the mean value of normal transactions is the most relevant
of the transaction aggregated features. The problem of both
categories is that they rely only on transaction information.
Hence, when a contract did not execute any transactions,
there is no information to make a classification. Lastly, the
advantage of using all the feature groups together, is that while
the most important features from each group are at the top of
the joint importance ranking, they also cover the weaknesses
of each set.
TABLE IV
THE THREE MOST IMPORTANT FEATURES PER FEATURE CATEGORY.
Category Feature Importance
All fundFlowCase83 0.657
All normalTransactionValueMean 0.107
All numSourceCodeLines 0.071
Only Transactions normalTransactionValueMean 0.576
Only Transactions normalTransactionValueStd 0.117
Only Transactions normalTransactionGasUsedStd 0.077
Only Source Code numSourceCodeLines 0.424
Only Source Code compilerPatchVersion136 0.129
Only Source Code compilerPatchVersion125 0.070
Only Fund Flow fundFlowCase83 0.799
Only Fund Flow fundFlowCase201 0.036
Only Fund Flow fundFlowCase79 0.032
C. Simulated Detection of Unknown Honeypot Techniques
The previous experiment measures how well the machine
learning model generalizes the classification to contracts that
were not seen during training, but those contracts share hon-
eypot techniques with other contracts that were present in the
training set. In the following experiment, we intend to simulate
what would happen if we need to classify a contract that
belongs to a honeypot technique that we never encountered
before. In order to do so, we change the cross validation
strategy by picking one honeypot technique at a time: we
build the testing set only with the samples belonging to it,
and the training set with the remaining samples. This results
in the eight different experiments that are shown in Table V.
Because the test set is composed solely of positive cases, we
measure the test Recall = TP/(TP + FN).
The high recall for all cases implies that the machine learn-
ing approach can detect honeypots that were not seen during
training. This is a clear advantage over HONEYBADGER.
Because it relies on expert knowledge of the different honeypot
techniques to craft detection rules, it is unable to detect new,
yet unknown techniques.
D. Detection of New Honeypots and Honeypot Techniques
The labels we obtained from HONEYBADGER correspond
to contracts that the tool marked as honeypots and that were
afterwards manually validated by its authors. Nevertheless, it
TABLE V
SIMULATING THE DETECTION FOR UNKNOWN HONEYPOT TECHNIQUES.
THE TEST STEP INCLUDES ONLY HONEYPOTS FROM ONE HONEYPOT TYPE
AT A TIME, AND THE TRAIN INVOLVES THE REST OF THE CONTRACTS.
Removed Honeypot Technique FN TP Recall
Type Deduction Overflow 0 4 1.000
Uninitialised Struct 2 37 0.949
Hidden Transfer 1 12 0.923
Hidden State Update 12 123 0.911
Inheritance Disorder 4 39 0.907
Straw Man Contract 3 28 0.903
Skip Empty String Literal 1 9 0.900
Balance Disorder 3 17 0.850
does not mean that the rest of the contracts are necessarily
non-honeypots. A considerable amount of human work is
required to inspect millions of instances of Solidity source
code. In this section we describe a mechanism to review the
unlabeled contracts in a time efficient manner. Firstly we train
ten different XGBoost models using ten stratified folds, and for
each contract we calculate the probability of being a honeypot
with each model. Secondly, we compute the mean and standard
deviation of the ten values for each contract. Lastly, we rank
the contracts in descending order using the mean probability
of being a honeypot. A large standard deviation can be used
to filter out the contracts for which the models did not agree
on the prediction. The resulting ranking serves as a guide
to the order in which the contracts should be inspected. We
decided to manually validate the first 100 samples of the list,
and discovered 57 new instances of honeypots. The amount
of honeypot instances by technique are described in Table VI.
From those instances, we found 3 extra copies by matching
hashes of contract byte code. Among the techniques of the
honeypots we found, two are not part of the HONEYBADGER
study.
TABLE VI
NUMBER OF NEW HONEYPOTS DISCOVERED BY TECHNIQUE.
BD ID TDO US HSU HT SMC UC MKET
1 13 1 6 16 8 5 6 1
The first of the newly found honeypots uses a call to transfer
funds to a potential attacker, provided they sent funds first.
However, the call is not complete: it is prepared, but never
executed, as the parenthesis required for the execution are
missing. HONEYBADGER cannot detect this honeypot, as most
compiler versions remove the unnecessary bytecode that sets
up the call. Furthermore, since the call is never executed,
there is also no CALL opcode within the bytecode. With
the approach proposed in this paper, however, this honeypot
technique can be detected, as more information, such as
transactions sent to contracts, is analyzed. We propose to name
this honeypot technique Unexecuted Call (UC).
The second honeypot4 that has been found with our ap-
proach is detailed in the following. It implements transfers to
the owner only. As such it seems that the honeypot serves
4For example: 0xf5615138a7f2605e382375fa33ab368661e017ff.
as a container for the owner’s funds. The owner however can
seemingly be overwritten in a function that serves to initialize
the contract and can be called by anyone. The honeypot
suggests that anyone can become owner and then transfer all
contained funds to themselves. However, the contract owner
can never truly be changed from the value set during the
deployment. This is due to the contract making use of a
mapping to store the owner variable. This mapping uses a
string, ”Stephen”, as the key to access the owner. When writing
the contract owner during deployment and whenever reading
the owner variable, the correct key is used. However, in the
initialization function, a misleading key is employed. Instead
of using the same key when overwriting the owner, the used
key is slightly, but not noticeably different. In fact, a cyrillic
letter ”e”5 is introduced as the second ”e” in ”Stephen”. It is
so similar to the basic ”e”6 that a user cannot easily recognize
it. Nevertheless, the code makes the distinction. Therefore, the
initialization function, which requires to be sent funds to in
order to be executed properly is unable to update the owner.
Instead, it stores the new value under an altogether different
key. Moreover, only the real owner can retrieve the funds. Due
to the employed technique, we propose to name this honeypot
technique Map Key Encoding Trick (MKET).
VI. RELATED WORK
In [7], Torres et al. proposed the first taxonomy of hon-
eypots. They identified eight different honeypot techniques
and implemented a tool, HONEYBADGER, to detect them.
HONEYBADGER uses static analysis to analyse Ethereum
smart contracts. Before that, in the domain of smart contracts,
static analysis has been used to detect vulnerabilities [19],
[20], and to verify the compliance and violation of patterns
[21]. While other such tools exist, they focus on the security
of smart contracts and not on honeypots or scams. Scams,
specifically Ponzi schemes, on Ethereum are investigated in
[22], however smart contracts with source code are analyzed
manually. A tool for detecting Ponzi schemes using machine
learning is discussed in [23]. Machine learning has also been
used in [24] to rapidly adapt to new attack patterns in order
to detect them. Other uses of machine learning in this domain
put more emphasis on transactions, however also for security
reasons [25] and [26], to detect anomalies [27] or to predict
the bitcoin price [28].
In this paper, we use a machine learning approach to detect
a specific type of scam, honeypots. Similar to other works, we
use source code information and transaction data. However, we
also put emphasis on the flow of funds. Our machine learning
approach, as opposed to HONEYBADGER, also allows us to
discover new honeypots, as discussed in Section V-D.
VII. FUTURE WORK
There are several ways in which this paper can be extended.
We could explore the possibility of extracting features from
the contract names based on the work presented in [29],
5Unicode code 1077: https://www.codetable.net/decimal/1077.
6Unicode code 101: https://www.codetable.net/decimal/101.
by crossing the occurrence of words in the contract names
with a list of relevant terms for the Ethereum community.
Another alternative could be to calculate a global state of
account balances after the execution of all the transactions of a
contract, instead of only checking fund flows per transaction.
We conceived the fund flow cases with the initial goal of
analysing the temporal dependencies between each other. In
other words, we wanted to study the behavior of contracts
using sequences of discrete symbols, which is equivalent to
work with character strings or list of words. However, as we
found that most of the honeypots present very short sequences,
the approach was not successful in finding useful patterns.
In the end, we only used in this paper uni-gram frequencies,
and discarded other alternatives like Markov Chains, n-gram
frequencies, or Recurrent Neural Networks. Nevertheless, we
plan to employ fund flow case sequences in future studies, to
classify contracts (or even accounts) with a larger transaction
history, into categories that do not involve honeypots.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we presented a step by step methodology
to obtain, process and analyze Ethereum contracts for the
task of honeypot detection. We showed how assumptions and
hypotheses about honeypot behavior can be contrasted with
real data, and derived features for classification models7. The
machine learning models proved to generalize well, even when
all the contracts belonging to one honeypot technique were
removed from training. Most importantly, we showed that
our technique detected honeypots from two new techniques,
which would be impossible to achieve using byte code analysis
without manually crafting new detection rules. Furthermore,
we proved that HONEYBADGER’s rules covering known hon-
eypot techniques were not capturing all the existing honeypot
instances.
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